广东南山花岗岩形成时代、地球化学特征与成因

广东南山花岗岩体位于陂头复式岩体西端,锆石的SHRIMP U-Pb年龄为158.1±1.8Ma,是燕山早期岩浆活动的产物.岩石化学特征显示岩体以高硅、富碱、贫Ca和Mg以及高TFeO/MgO、低CaO/Na2O为特征.其K2O/Na2O>1,A/NK=7.8～11.92,A/CNK=1.33～1.68,属过铝质碱性岩石.在稀土和微量元素组成上,岩石富含稀土元素(除明显的负Eu异常,δEu=0.09～0.16)以及Zr、Y、Th、U、Nb等高场强元素,贫Ba、Sr、Ti等,高10000x Ga/AI(比值大于2.6).在Zr、Nb、Ce、Y对10000×Ga/Al以及TFeO/MgO-SiO2等A型花岗岩多种判别图上,投影点主要落在A型花岗岩区,而与高分异的I、S型花岗岩明显不同.这些特征均指示,南山岩体具有铝质A型花岗岩的特点.通过Y-Nb-3Ga和Y-Nb-Ce构造环境判别图解将其进一步划分为A2型花岗岩,代表其形成于拉张的构造背景之下.本文在此研究基础上,认为南山花岗质岩浆可能形成于相对挤压的中侏罗世.而在晚侏罗世早期相对拉张的作用下,岩石圈减薄,软流圈地幔上涌,地壳的泥质岩和少量砂质岩受到幔源流体富集后发生部分熔融后上侵形成铝质A型花岗岩,且有较强的结晶分异作用.     

丛式并井眼交碰风险因素分析及安全技术对策

分析了丛式井井眼交碰的影响因素,从设计和施工两个方面提出了具体的技术措施,提出了以余隙系数(K)作为设计和施工的准则,以Btotal数值作为判断井眼是否接近的准则,经过实际应用,验证了以上技术措施的可靠性。     

地下水年龄在地下水研究中的应用研究进展

近些阜,同位素和示踪技术广泛地应用于地下水研究中,其中以对地下水定年的研究尤为突出.本文通过研究国内外大量的研究实例,分析得出地下水年龄在评价地下水更新能力,正确认识地下水运动和溶质迁移规律,以及约束地下水模型参数等方面具有重要作用;同对指出地下永定年不仅受到地下水混合作用、气-水-岩作用等自然因素的影响,还受到人类活...     

水利工程对南四湖现代沉积速率的影响

利用放射性同位素(137Cs、210Pb)测年法计算山东省南四湖的沉积速率,采用高纯锗γ谱仪(美国EG&G ORTEC公司)对南四湖上级湖、下级湖的沉积岩柱(DS2和WS2)样品进行137Cs、210Pb放射性活度测试,分析水利工程建设对湖泊沉积影响的程度与后果. 结果表明:上级湖、下级湖137Cs总蓄积量之比为9.7,说明在二级坝水利工程影响下,流域内侵蚀泥沙及其所吸附的137Cs主要沉积于上级湖;137Cs在湖泊沉积物中的剖面分布与137Cs大气沉降时序的分布模式相背离,故137Cs蓄积峰不具备时标意义. 利用210Pb计年的CRS(恒定补给速率)模式分析2个沉积岩柱不同质量深度所对应的年代,结果显示,150多年来南四湖上级湖、下级湖的沉积速率不稳定,以1960年为界划分为两大时段:沉积岩柱底部所对应的年代至1960年,上级湖、下级湖沉积速率平均值分别为0.069、0.160 g/(cm2·a);1960—2010年,二者沉积速率平均值分别为0.218、0.072 g/(cm2·a). 可见,二级坝水利工程对南四湖沉积速率产生了重要影响,210Pb计年的CRS模式分析结果可靠.      

Villains,victims, and heroes: Accounting for the roles human activity plays in LOPA scenarios

When a team is analyzing a LOPA scenario, the team needs to consider all three roles played by human interaction in the scenario: that of cause, as a result of human error; that of receptor, both in terms of safety impacts (inside the fence line) and community impacts (outside the fence line); and that of independent layer of protection (IPL), considering both administrative controls and human responses. Frequently, the nature of these three roles are inter-related, and setting guidance that is internally consistent is important to using LOPA to assess risk rather than as a means to game the analyses to simply achieve a wished-for result.A number of criteria have been proposed to quantify human involvement, typically as cause, as receptor, or as IPL. Establishing a framework to look at all three in a unified way is more likely to result in analyses that are consistent from scenario to scenario.This paper describes such a framework and presents it in a way that allows organizations to review their own criteria for quantifying human involvement in LOPA. It also examines some of the published LOPA criteria for human involvement and looks at them in terms of consistency of approach between evaluation of cause, receptor, and IPL. Finally the paper makes suggestions to use in calibrating LOPA methodologies to achieve consistent and believable results in terms of human interaction within and between scenarios that have worked for other organizations.     

煤矿人为失误的原因及控制

随着科学技术的进步,机器设备的可靠性得到了大幅度的提高,人为失误导致的事故比例快速上升.掌握人为失误的原因,进而控制人为失误的发生是有效减少事故发生的重要措施.在对神火煤电股份有限公司新庄矿深入调查了解的基础上,初步探讨了煤矿人为失误的原因,提出了控制人为失误的有效途径.     

基于人因失误分析的医院电气安全管理研究

医院是重点用电单位,用电的安全性和供电可靠性都比较高,但因不可抗力、供电系统故障、医院管理问题、人为失误等方面的原因,仍存在发生各类电气突发事件的风险。其中,由人的误操作或不安全行为因素而诱发的电气方面的突发事件已成为医院非医疗事故的主要原因。文章针对医院电气安全操作方面的人因失误,从个人和组织两个角度进行了失误原因的分析,认为人的失误既受个体因素的影响,也受环境、制度和管理水平的影响。在此基础上,提出完善相关规章制度建设、加强教育与培训等,从组织制度建设、人员技术素质提高等方面,提出预防与减少人因失误的措施与方法,提高供配电质量,为医院医疗工作提供有效的电气安全后勤保障。     

基于HFACS的空中相撞事故分析及建议

空中相撞事故往往是由诸多人为差错相互叠加、耦合和作用而导致的,要找出事故的真正诱因,防止类似事故再次发生,难度非常大。为了有效地分析和定位人为差错,以更好地服务于防相撞的管理与决策,提出一种基于人为因素分析分类系统（HFACS）的空中相撞事故分析方法,它按照从显性差错到隐性差错的思路来分析事故的诱因,最终找出组织因素对事故的影响。并利用HFACS对巴西卡欣布上空发生的一起空中相撞事故进行了系统分析。案例分析结果表明,该方法不仅能够找出导致空中相撞事故的人为差错,解释事故发生的原因和过程,而且能够据此提供防止相撞事故发生的安全建议。     

曹妃甸老龙口现代沉积环境及重金属污染特征研究

利用测年、重金属测定、粒度测定等方法,对河北曹妃甸老龙口区域的7个柱状沉积物进行了粒度、沉积物的测年、重金属含量测定和分析,探讨潮滩重金属沉积的控制因素和迁移规律.结果显示,老龙口潮滩属于细沙和粉沙,根据同位素测年结果,L06沉积速率最大,为0.90cm/a;其余柱状样沉积速率均小于0.5cm/a,平均沉积速率为0.32cm/a,曹妃甸潮滩属于缓慢沉积;柱状样垂直方向波动剧烈,受人类活动影响明显.重金属的含量在柱样的30~40cm深度呈现向表层递增的趋势,Hg、Cr的污染比较严重、其他元素基本无污染.虽然多数重金属元素在背景值附近没有出现污染现象,生态危害性极低,但是,受Pb、Hg中度重金属生态危害的影响,该区域多种重金属生态危害指数(ERI)达158.41,表现为中等程度的生态危害性;存在一定的潜在生态风险.     

Analysis of underlying causes of investigated loss of containment incidents in Dutch Seveso plants using the Storybuilder method

In the Netherlands there are around 400 “Seveso” sites that fall under the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) 1999. Between 2006 and 2010 the Dutch Labour Inspectorate's Directorate for Major Hazard Control completed investigations of 118 loss of containment incidents involving hazardous substances from this group. On the basis of investigation reports the incidents were entered in a tailor-made tool called Storybuilder developed for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for identifying the dominant patterns of technical safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management causes associated with the resulting loss of control events. The model is a bow-tie structure with six lines of defence, three on either side of the central loss of containment event. In the first line of defence, failures in the safety barriers leading to loss of control events were primarily equipment condition failures, pre start-up and safeguarding failures and process deviations such as pressure and flow failures. These deviations, which should have been recovered while still within the safe envelope of operation, were missed primarily because of inadequate indication signals that the deviations have occurred. Through failures of subsequent lines of defence they are developing into serious incidents. Overall, task failures are principally failures to provide adequate technical safety barriers and failures to operate provided barriers appropriately. Underlying management delivery failures were mainly found in equipment specifications and provisions, procedures and competence. The competence delivery system is especially important for identifying equipment condition, equipment isolation for maintenance, pre-start-up status and process deviations. Human errors associated with operating barriers were identified in fifty per cent of cases, were mostly mistakes and feature primarily in failure to prevent deviations and subsequently recover them. Loss of control associated with loss of containment was primarily due to the containment being bypassed (72% of incidents) and less to material strength failures (28%). Transfer pipework, connections in process plant and relief valves are the most frequent release points and the dominant release material is extremely flammable. It is concluded that the analysis of a large number of incidents in Storybuilder can support the quantification of underlying causes and provide evidence of where the weak points exist in major hazard control in the prevention of major accidents.